

**DANIEL BELL'S CONCEPT OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY:
THEORY, MYTH, AND IDEOLOGY**

The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting, by Daniel Bell. New York: Basic Books, 1973. Pp. xiii, 507. \$16.00.

The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, by Daniel Bell. New York: Basic Books, 1976. Pp. xvi, 301. \$14.95.

One of the signs of weakness in contemporary American political science is its susceptibility to invasion from other disciplines. To say this is not to argue that any academic field should ignore developments in other fields and not be subject to cross fertilization with them, any more than any nation should seek to hermetically seal itself off from outside cultural influences. But just as national identity and ultimately national power can be threatened by cultural conquest from the outside, so can academic disciplines lose their bearings and integrity by adopting paradigms from other fields which may not do justice to the nature of their own data or help to answer the questions they seek to resolve.

A case in point in contemporary political science is research and teaching in the area of the politics of "developing" nations. In the post World War II period, discussion of comparative politics was overwhelmed by the belief, adopted from economics, that there were such things as "underdeveloped" (actually a euphemism for poor or backward) countries with special characteristics as defined by the discipline of economics. Faced with the problem of enlarging their focus from the nation states of Europe and North America in order to deal with a horde of "new nations," students of comparative politics allowed themselves to assume that there must be common political characteristics of these "underdeveloped" nations which correlated with their economic characteristics and a new subfield was born of this seduction. Moreover, in the circumstances it was also natural to further assume that—since economic criteria defined the new field of study—in these nations economics was the dominant, independent variable and politics the subordinate dependent factor. Needless to

say, the fruits of this mesalliance have been sickly and deformed, and only in the past few years have political scientists begun to integrate the study of these countries into paradigms of primarily political significance.'

But if political science has been reasserting its integrity in resisting the imposition of an often misleading economic paradigm on the study of the less developed—i.e., less industrialized—nations of the world, it has been increasingly subject to a new invasion from without. This time the new paradigm originates in sociology and seeks to reorient our study of the developed, advanced industrial nations. This new frame of reference coalesces around the concept of "post-industrial society," as developed by Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell and a number of major and minor epigoni.² The very thinness and vagueness of the theoretical basis of "post-industrial" theorizing paradoxically adds to rather than detracts from its influence. Thus we find books and papers which use the term "post-industrial" in their titles or refer to the term in their introductions, only to define or use the term in various ways or not at all in the actual analysis of data or exposition of material.' Yet increasing numbers of political scientists seem to act on the maxim that where there is so much smoke (or haze) there must be fire, and the term gains in currency.

1. For an evaluation of the current state of the study of the politics of developing societies see Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, "Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development," *American Political Science Review* LXIX (1975) Pp. 979-994. Pioneer attempts to assert the autonomy of political variables in that study include Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development*. (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966) and Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

2. One of the earliest contemporary usages is in Bertram Gross, "Space-Time and Post-Industrial Society," CAG Occasional Papers, Comparative Administration Group, American Society for Public Administration, May 1966. This antedates Bell's usage but is not followed up by later systematic work on Gross' part.

3. The term is used, without explanation or elucidation in, for example, Warren Moxley. "Post—Industrial Politics: A Guide to 1976." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 15, 1975, Pp. 2475-2478; Talcott Parsons, "Religion in Post-Industrial America: The Problem of Secularization," *Social Research* 41 (1974): Pp. 193-225; Richard L. Simpson, "Beyond Rational Bureaucracy: Changing Values and Social Implications in Post-Industrial Society," *Social Forces* 51 (1972): 1-6; Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, "Power, Politics, and Personality in Post-Industrial Society," *Journal of Politics*, 40 (1978): Pp. 675-717; Erazim V. Kohak, "Being Young in a Post-Industrial Society," *Dissent XVIII* (February 1971): Pp. 30-40; Magorah Murayama, "The Post-Industrial Logic," in Andrew A. Spekke (ed.), *The Next 25 Years: Crisis and Opportunity* (Washington: World Futures Society, 1975), Pp. 43-50; Edward T. Mason, "The Corporation in the Post-Industrial State," *California Management Review*, XII (Summer 1970): PP. 5-25. Political scientist Martin O.

As a result, there is growing up within political science an implicit new paradigm for the study of advanced industrial societies which assumes that as the result of various postulated social, economic, and technological changes there now exists a number of what can be called

Heisler entitles a collection of readings *Politics in Europe. Structures and Processes in Some Post-Industrial Democracies* (New York: David McKay, 1974) but never tells us what the word means, implying it has something to do with being "advanced" and "affluent." Other political scientists tell us that their book grows out of "increasing interest in the concept of post-industrial society," Lawrence Mayer and John C. Burnett, *Politics in Industrial Societies. A Comparative Perspective* (New York: John Wiley, 1977), P. vii but then go on to say "the term post-industrial has become something of a catchword and often implies a difference in kind rather than degree, we prefer to use the concept of a mature industrial society," *Ibid.* They then go on to use the terms post-and advanced-industrial interchangeably, saying the difference is a "matter of degree." Pp. 362-373. M. Donald Hancock says that "A minimum definition of post-industrial society, as it is presently emerging in the United States and parts of Western Europe, is that it is a socioeconomic system in which, white-collar or service strata have displaced blue-collar workers as the dominant labor force," and beyond that there is little agreement. "The United States, Europe, and Post-Industrial Society," *Comparative Politics* 4 (1971): P. 132. One of the few political scientists to try to use the term systematically is Bell's associate Samuel Huntington, "Post-Industrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" in James William Morley (ed.), *Prologue to the Future. The United States and Japan in the Post-Industrial Age* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973, Pp. 89-127.) A systematic critique of Bell is found in the work of sociologist Benjamin S. Kleinberg, *American Society in the Post-Industrial Age. Technocracy, Power and the End of Ideology* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1973). A substantially different use of the term is found in M. Donald Hancock, *Sweden. The Politics of Post-Industrial Change* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1972). Hancock says a post-industrial society "can be defined as one in which the primacy of capital accumulation and industrial accumulation yields to the potential primacy of redistribution...." (P. 7), and speaks of societies "attaining post-industrial complexity, affluence, and redistributive potentialities...." (P. 269). Hancock's usage is nearer to those of Alain Touraine and Herman Kahn than that of Bell (see below). Victor Basiuk accepts and uses the term but is skeptical of alleged shifts in political power and believes applied knowledge is of more increasing importance than theoretical. See *Technology, World Politics and American Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), Pp. 259-274. In the voluminous 8 volume *Handbook of Political Science* edited by Nelson Polsby and Fred I. Greenstein (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975) the term appears in only three articles, being mentioned in passing by Bell's associates Kahn (Vol. VII, P. 411) and Huntington (Vol. III, P. 95) and several times in another article, "Science Policy" by Harvey M. Sapolsky, Vol. VI, Pp. 79-110. In the massive international survey *Science, Technology and Society. A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective* edited by Ina Spiegel-Rosing and Derek de Solla Price (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977) the term is not indexed, though it appears twice in an essay by American political scientist Sanford Lakoff. Despite this mixed scholarly usage and reception, numerous college courses are now being given with post-industrial in their titles.

post-industrial societies, so different socially from previously existing industrial societies that they must (in a reductionist assumption) constitute a different class of political entities, with their own special characteristics and dynamics. The United States and Canada, Japan, Australia, the wealthier nations of Western Europe, and even in some treatments Eastern Europe and the USSR are considered to fit into this new category of post-industrial. Given these intellectual developments it would appear both salutary and necessary that political scientists take a close look at the concept of post-industrialism in order to ascertain its logical coherence, its empirical validity, and its implications—whether it be valid or not for political science both descriptive and normative.

Treatments of and reference to the concept of post-industrialism now abound, but the central figure in its introduction and popularization has been Professor Bell, and primary reference will be to his work and ideas. Though he introduced and used the concept in a number of papers both before and after the publication of his major work on the subject, his most extensive and relatively systematic exposition is found in *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, published in 1973.⁴ A subsequent major book, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* published in 1976, deals with some of the same themes. Apparently it stands, in the corpus of Bell's work, as a substitute for originally projected volumes on the politics and culture of post-industrial society which were to have supplemented the primarily socio-economic focus of the original exposition, and its nature and conclusions in themselves are significant for the light they shed on the validity and usefulness of Bell's central thesis. Somewhat ironically, Bell himself rarely uses the concept of post-industrial society in his later writings—which is rather as though Marx were to have coined the concepts of surplus value and the class struggle and then gone on to comment on economic and political development without making use of them.¹

4. Critical reaction was mixed with much of it hostile. Christopher Lasch argued that "the case for the transition to post-industrial society cannot easily be refuted, because it was never stated with any precision to begin with," *New York Review of Books*, October 18, 1973, leading to an angry polemical exchange. Norman Birnbaum wrote that it "lacks theoretical drive, and its argument is repetitive—not all of it consistent." *New York Times Book Review*, July 1, 1973. Joseph Featherstone was more mildly critical in a review essay "A Failure of Political Imagination," *New Republic*, September 15, 1973 and September 22, 1973. Despite such reactions the term caught on widely among social scientists.

The Coming of Post-Industrial Society constitutes an attempt to describe a newly emerging social reality which while not determining political and cultural life (a point which Bell stresses but which is often implicitly ignored by others, including political scientists who have taken over his ideas) does at least strongly condition them. Its focus is on the changing nature of work and work relationships, on the increasing role of scientists and technicians in the social order, and on the allegedly central role increasingly played by theoretical knowledge in social change and the making of societal decisions, a role epitomized by the rise of social and economic planning as a tool of public policy. All these changes taken together—and the book is replete with empirical and statistical data (some of dubious cogency) attempting to illustrate them—constitute what Bell denominates the emergence of a new society which he calls post-industrial. *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* is a series of loosely related essays which seek primarily to defend post-industrial society—based as it is on rationalism and technical efficiency—against what Bell sees as a growing menace from irrational and hedonistic forces spawned by the very successes of advanced capitalism in creating affluence and opportunities for individual self-expression.

Unfortunately, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, the term "post-industrial" as used by Bell and others who have adopted his usage has done more to obscure than to illuminate the phenomena of contemporary social life. But because of the extent to which human perception conditions social life the very use of the term creates a kind of quasi-existence for what it purports to describe. In this sense the "theorists" of post-industrial society are inevitably ideologists working to create—if not a new society as such—a new way of looking at the social world which has important consequences for actual social relations.

5. Bell redefines and alludes to the concept in *Cultural Contradictions* but it is hardly central to his argument. He uses the term in an interview, "Big Challenge: 'Creation of a Genuine National Society,'" *U.S. News and World Report*, July 5, 1976 and mentions it in passing in an article, "Teletext and Technology: New Networks of Knowledge and Information in Post-Industrial Society," *Encounter* XLVII (June 1977): Pp. 9-29, but does happily without it in such recent pieces as "The End of American Exceptionalism," *The Public Interest*, No. 41 (Fall 1975): Pp. 193-224; "Mediating Growth Tensions," *Society*, 15 (Jan-Fed 1978): Pp. 34-38; and "A Report on England I. The Future That Never Was," *The Public Interest*, No. 51 (Spring 1978): Pp. 35-73, although the term is used in a footnote, p. 63. Note also its absence in "Technology, Nature and Society: The Vicissitudes of Three World Views and the Confusion of Realms," *American Scholar*, 42 (1973): Pp. 385-404.

Origins of the Concept of "Post-Industrialism"

What does the term "post-industrial society" mean? In order to answer that question properly we have to ask a prior question, What are its intellectual origins? Even to ask the question is to plunge oneself immediately into a polemical context. Speaking loosely—as one must, given the many and multifaceted usages of the word by Bell himself—a post-industrial society has several major characteristics of which the most significant are (1) the increasing importance of "service" industries (as opposed to primary production) in the economic order; (2) the increasing substitution of "knowledge"—especially "theoretical" knowledge—for property as the basis of the social order; (3) a resulting increasing reliance in the political order on technical expertise for the definition of, if not the actual resolution of, social and political problems; and (4) a consequent increase in the rationalization of social and political life, embodied most clearly in social planning of various kinds.⁶ We will be taking a closer look at the conceptual problems inherent in the idea of post-industrial society later, but first, it is useful to examine the genesis of the theory. Bell writes as a post-Marxist; as he himself argues, most subsequent social science has been a commentary on Marx.⁷ In his youth Bell was involved in circles where Marxism was the major subject of debate and

6. Bell's definitions and descriptions of the term appear in manifold overlapping form in several works. He himself has said that the "concept" is neither a "definition" nor a "forecast" but a "scenario." "Dialogue: The Next Stage of History" by Timothy A. Tilton and Daniel Bell, *Social Research* 40 (1973): P. 747, although it is not always easy to square his usage of the term scenario with the standard usage among futurists. On scenarios, see Ian H. Wilson, "Scenarios," in Jib Fowles (ed.), *Handbook of Futures Research* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1978) Pp. 225-248. On Bell's methodology see also Thomas E. Jones, "Daniel Bell's Evolving Vision of the Post-Industrial Society," *World Future Society Bulletin XIII* (Jan-Feb 1978): Pp. 7-24. Bell began using the term in *The Reforming of General Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) P. 87 ca. and first presented his ideas at length in "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society" in *The Public Interest*, No. 6 (Winter 1967): Pp. 24-35 and No. 7 (Spring 1967): Pp. 102-118 and developed them at length in *The Coming*, *op. cit.* He explicates his ideas and defends them against criticism leveled at their early presentations in "The Post-Industrial Society: The Evolution of An Idea," *Survey* 17 (1971): Pp. 102-168. See also "Post-Industrial Society: A Symposium," *ibid.* and Peter M. Stearns and Daniel Bell "Controversy: Is There a Post-Industrial Society?" *Society* 11 (May-June 1974): Pp. 10-25.

7. "We Have All Become 'Post-Marxist.'" *Coming*, *op. cit.*, P. 55.

where Trotskyism was a major intellectual force.⁸ While Bell bitterly denies any connection between the genesis of his ideas and other theories of social change originating in these circles, such as James Burnham's concept of the "managerial revolution," the circumstantial evidence would seem to suggest otherwise. Bell's concept of post-industrial society is obviously an answer to the problem which Stalinism posed to all Marxists at that time, and since—a problem which was answered by Trotsky in a way which seems to have significantly influenced Bell.

What was this problem? Essentially, it was the problem of how to account for the continued existence of relationships of class domination and subordination within Soviet society *after* private property—according to classical Marxism the source of all such domination—had been legally abolished. Obviously some factor other than property was now the basis of political, economic, and social power in the Soviet Union. What was it? Trotsky's theories of state capitalism, in which classes (based by definition on property) are replaced by "strata" (based on just what is unclear).¹⁰ Burnham's "managerial revolution" and Djilas' "new class"¹¹—and a whole host of theories about "bureaucracy" are attempts to answer this question. Bell's concept of post-industrial society belongs to this family of theories. It postulates that property has been succeeded by knowledge as the primary basis of social power. Though Bell focuses on the United States in his exposition of his theory, it is, of course, a solution to the problem posed by Soviet society as well.

But, if property is no longer the basis of power in society, important consequences follow. The central revolutionary role of the industrial proletariat disappears; indeed, it does so together with the whole class structure of industrial society. As this class structure disappears, so does ideology as well, since it is based on conflict over property and privileges (at least as construed and dealt with by Marx and by the

8. The relationship of Trotskyism, Bell's intellectual background, and the concept of "post-industrial society" is alluded to in Lewis Feuer, "Ideology and No End," *Encounter*, XL (April 1973): Pp. 84-87. Bell's own account is found in *Coming, op. cit.*, Pp. 87-99.

9. *The Managerial Revolution* (New York: John Day, 1941). Bell attacks Burnham and others in *Coming, op. cit.*, Pp. 90-92. See also "The Post-Industrial Society: Evolution...", *op. cit.*: Pp. 140-142.

10. Trotsky's ideas are elaborated in *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972).

11. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York: Praeger, 1957).

defenders of capitalism both) and it is thus now meaningless. Bell is, in this implicit definition of the substance of ideological conflict, being far more of a Marxist than he perhaps realizes. To say that the end of the class struggle means the end of ideology ignores—as does his more or less repudiated master, Marx—such possible ideological factors as nationalism, religion, and race, to name only a few which Bell seems implicitly to regard as overshadowed by class and economic concerns just as Marx explicitly does. Thus the theory of post-industrial society converges with—if it does not in some sense directly derive from—the concept of the "end of ideology" which Bell had enunciated earlier.¹² The existence of post-industrial society provides the theoretical underpinning for the end of ideology while the end of ideology becomes one of the characteristics of post-industrial society, as knowledge-based rationality comes to dominate politics.

This outcome is made possible by another repudiation of orthodox Marxism on Bell's part. Industrial capitalism has—contrary to Marx's predictions of the increasing immiseration of the masses and the ultimate necessary economic collapse of capitalism in a gotterdammerung of unemployment and depression—made possible a new era of abundance for all.¹³ Indeed, from a purely structural point of view, the growth of the service industries and proliferation of higher education—important elements of post-industrial society—can be regarded as evidence of this. This abundance itself renders old ideologies obsolete.

In this connection, however, some curious anomalies arise. One of Bell's most fervent followers in spreading the gospel of the coming of post-industrial society is his colleague in futurism, Herman Kahn. Kahn and his followers use the term more loosely than Bell to mean primarily an era of material abundance, a usage Bell seems—with uncharacteristic intellectual tolerance—to find unobjectionable.¹⁴ But Kahn at least does not assume that this post-industrial society of abun-

12. *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959). The relationship of the theory of post-industrial society to that of the "end of ideology" is discussed at length in Kleinberg, *op. cit.*, Pp. 1-23.

13. Abundance is assumed through Bell's writings and the scarcity theories of the Club of Rome and similar groups are explicitly rejected in *Coming, op. cit.*, Pp. 456-479 and Bell's "The End of Scarcity," *Saturday Review of Society*, 1 (May 1973): Pp. 49-52.

14. Kahn began pushing the concept of post-industrialism as early as 1967. Kahn and Anthony J. Weiner, "The Next Thirty-Three Years: A Framework for Speculation," in Bell (ed.), "Toward the Year 2000: Work In Progress," *Daedalus* 96 (Summer 1967) P. 726, at the same time giving it their own meaning of a society of abundance. This usage is followed and expanded in their book *The Year 2000: A*

dance will put an end to ideology and what technocrats regard as political irrationalism." Nor do writers such as Samuel Huntington, who use the term post-industrial in a way that combines the usages of Bell and Kahn." In *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* Bell ironically evidences fear bordering on panic that political and cultural irrationality, often taking ideological form, will not only continue to exist in post-industrial society but may threaten its very existence.

What Is "Post-Industrial Society" All About?

Having loosely described post-industrial society and indicated its historical origins in post-Marxist theorizing and in the ideology of the end of ideology, we must now ask what the term really means. Bell, unfortunately for our present purposes, does not share Hobbes' admiration for Euclid, and it is difficult to pin down central propositions. from which others flow in his various expositions of the concept:⁷ On

Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York: Macmillan, 1967) esp. pages 25 and 186. Yet Bell contributes a preface in which he reiterates his own definition (p. xxvii) but does not take issue with theirs. See also Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, *Things to Come. Thinking About the 70's and 80's* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), esp. P. 220 and Kahn and Leon Martel, *The Next 200 Years* (New York: William Morrow, 1976) P. 1. This notion of post-industrial society as one combining affluence plus technological development is similar to those of Hancock cited above and that used by Christopher Lasch, despite the pseudo-Marxist spin he gives it, in "Toward a Theory of Post-Industrial Society," in M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (eds.), *Politics in the Post-Welfare State. Responses to the New Individualism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Pp. 36-50. This usage has crept into the secondary literature as well. See Edward C. Pytlík, Donald P. Lauda, and David L. Johnson, *Technology, Change, and Society* (Worcester: Davis, 1978), Pp. 91-106.

15. Discussions of various forms of possible future political, religious, and cultural irrationality abound in the many possible "scenarios" proffered in Kahn's works, see especially *The Year 200* (*op. cit.*) and *Things To Come* (*op. cit.*).

16. "Post-Industrial Politics. How Benign...", *op. cit.*, Pp. 187-188.

17. Thus in his rambling *The Coming*, Bell variously speaks of this new society as having "five dimensions, or components" (P. 14), says that its significance consists in four different features (P. 43), presents a table of its "structures and problems" using eight "axial" principles (P. 119), discusses the role of science and technology as an "underpinning" (P. 197), says it "is a knowledge society" (P. 212) yet tells us "the business corporation remains, for the whole, the heart of the society" (P. 269), despite the fact that "today ownership is simply a legal fiction" (P. 294), presents a table on "stratification and power" with six elements (P. 359), later reduced to three variables (base of power, mode of access, and social unit) (P. 361), and in the "Coda" of the book presents still another elaborate scheme on "The societal Structure of Post-Industrial Society," (P. 375). As one commentator has noted, "Professor Bell's complex thought is sometimes difficult to master," Jonathan Gershuny, *After Industrial Society. The Emerging Self-Service Economy* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978), P. 158.

some points he is quite clear, however: post-industrialism does not constitute a factor (independent variable) from which other aspects of society flow in a causal fashion from cause to effect. Indeed, Bell is careful to argue, against Marx and much of the modern sociological tradition, that societies (civilizations?) are not organic wholes and that the political and cultural forms and characteristics of a society vary independently of its social form. Post-industrial society is a theory "primarily" about the economic-social-technological aspect of society." There can therefore be capitalist and socialist post-industrial societies." (Capitalism and socialism in Bell's usage are apparently thought of as political rather than social structures). Post-industrial society is not logically equivalent to bourgeois society," despite a long standing tendency of social historians to speak of bourgeois society and industrial society almost interchangeably, despite later socialist ventures into industrialization.

Bell's methodology turns on what he calls "axial" principles .²¹ As an analog, he offers Tocqueville's use of "equality" as a tool to explain early 19th century American society. Equality is not a causal factor like the introduction of the factory system, but it provides a basis for explaining a variety of social phenomena. Leaving aside any questions about the validity of Tocqueville's observations, the concept of axial principles presents certain problems. Equality—albeit a complex and subtle concept, as even Aristotle knew and discussed at length—is at least a single principle. It is relatively easy to visualize the metaphor and to think of societies revolving around an axis of equality or whatever, but how societies or other bodies can turn on more than one axis at a time is difficult to conceive. Post-industrial society is described by Bell in terms of many characteristics: how many, and which, varies from work to work, and sometimes from page to page. It is difficult to discover which, if any, are more important and how, if at all, they are related to one another. For instance, is there really any connection, necessary or otherwise, between an increasing number of workers in "service" occupations, the importance of theoretical knowledge, and universities replacing corporations as centers of power?

18. *Coming, op. cit.*, P. 13.

19. *Ibid.*, P. 114. Also, "Both the United States and the Soviet Union could become post-industrial societies," *Cultural Contradictions, op. cit.*, P. 14.

20. *Coming, op. cit.*, Pp. 12-13.

21. *Ibid.*, P. 10.

At the root of the problem is the term post-industrial itself. Post-industrialism defines one alleged reality in terms of another chronologically preceding reality. In his earlier incarnation as an academic, Zbigniew Brzezinski was caustic about this definition, arguing that it was about as useful as describing industrial society as "post-agricultural" to someone who knew only agricultural society. Post-industrialism, Brzezinski contended, is essentially a term without substantive content.²² He proposed instead the term "technetronic," since, in his view, it was the dominance of electronic communications technology that would differentiate the society to come from the previously existing industrial society.²³ The term has not caught on although, to add to the theoretical confusion engendered by the whole discussion, the idea behind it has. Thus many commentators have seized upon the notion that we are now entering upon an "information society" in which the exchange of communications has replaced the production of goods²⁴ and they—the Japanese are especially fond of this concept—use the terms "information society" and "post-industrial society" as practically synonymous.²⁵ Even Bell himself has shown some disposition to jump on this new bandwagon.²⁶

What is crucial, of course, is not whether television, computers, and similar means of communication and control exist and are absorbing more and more of the material and personnel resources of all societies,

22. *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), P. 9.

23. *Ibid.*, Pp. xiv, 11-12. For earlier formulations see "America in the Technetronic Era," *Encounter* 30 (January 1968): Pp. 16-26, and "Toward a Technetronic Society," *Current* 92 (February 1968): Pp. 33-38.

24. William Kuhns, *The Post-Industrial Prophets: Interpretations of Technology* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1971). For severe criticism of this perspective, see James W. Carey and John J. Quick, "The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution," *American Scholar* 39 (1970): Pp. 359-424. But see also "Electronics" special issue of *Science* 195 (1977): Pp. 1085-1240.

The movement from work to communication is a basic presupposition of Robert Theobald and J.M. Scott's quasi-utopia *Teg's 1994: An Anticipation of the Near Future* (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1972).

25. See James William Morley (ed.), *Prologue to the Future: The United States and Japan in the Post-Industrial Age* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath for the Japan Society, 1974) *passim* and also Yujiro Hayashi (ed.) *Perspectives on Post-Industrial Society* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1970) *passim*, especially the editor's "The Information-Centered Society," Pp. 33-45.

26. "The post-industrial society is an information society, as industrial society is a goods-producing society," appears as early as *Coming*, P. 467, but see especially his "Teletext and Technology," *op. cit.*

but, rather, what if anything this has to do with social structure and economic and political power. Does being an employee of IBM rather than U.S. Steel make any difference in one's economic or political status vis a vis others? This is the question which theorists of post-industrial society dance around by rarely and only chastely touch. Why becomes clear when we look at the concept of post-industrial society not in terms of what is new about it but what is not new. For not only does the usage "post-industrial" fail to define the new society (save that it is presumably different and "later" than—industrial society); it begs the question of what it is that post-industrial society is different from, that is, what an industrial society is in the first place. It is as if we were to define an adult as a person who had given up the things of childhood (*cf.*, St. Paul) without having defined childishness.

The plain truth of the matter is that we have only a vague definition and an unclear understanding of the nature and characteristics of industrial society. The major, if not the only, merit of the theory of post-industrial society is that it forces us to take a closer look at industrial society. Thus, it is analogous to the concept of political development as applied to the "Third World," which has forced us to reexamine the history and nature of the politics of "developed," nations." Similarly, most "futurism" is primarily valuable not because of what it can (or cannot) tell us about where we are going, but because of the questions it forces us to ask about where we are now."

Our working definition of industrialism is not really a definition at all. The beginnings of the "industrial revolution" have now been traced back to the early Middle Ages." What we have in the concept of "industrialism" is primarily a literary image—which sociologists have done much to contribute to and popularize—rather than a precise delineation of central and subsidiary factors.³⁰ We think of industrialism primarily in terms of images—urbanization, smoking fac-

27. See, for example S.M. Lipset *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963) and Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

28. On Futurology see Victor Ferkiss, *Futurology: Promise, Performance, Prospects*. (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1977).

29. Jean Gimpel, *The Medieval Machine. The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages* (New York: Penguin Books, 1977).

30. This point is extensively developed in Krishnan Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress: The Sociology of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society* (Hammondsworth, Eng.: Pelican Books, 1978).

tories, workers on assembly lines a la Charlie Chaplin in "Modern Times." Hence, when we perceive the growth of suburbs, the substitution of clean electronic plants for steel mills (more precisely the addition of the former to the latter), and the assembly line in the factory replaced (or supplemented) by that of the typing pool in the office or the service counter at MacDonal'd's, a little light blinks on in our brains as in an old-fashioned cartoon, and we say, "Aha! A post-industrial society." But this is not social theory.

In order to have a falsifiable, or even a logically interesting, theory about the coming into existence of post-industrial society it would first be necessary to define industrial society in terms of a single—or a small related group of—historically unique characteristics identified in such a way as to be operationalizable and empirically observable. Then, having established the existence of industrial society during the period in which it allegedly was the norm, one would, in order to posit the existence of post-industrial society, have to demonstrate on the basis of empirically observable data that the central characteristics or characteristics of industrialism no longer were dominant but had been superseded by other characteristics. Note that we are talking about societies—systems of social relations among human beings—not technical systems of production per se." It is easily conceivable that two agricultural societies could be growing rice in exactly the same way, although one consisted of free, land-owning farmers and the other of slaves. They would not be the same kind of society, however; when I.G. Farben used "slave-labor" drawn from captive nations during World War II, the assembly lines looked little different from the way they had looked like before Hitler's accession to power in 1933.

Though they are obviously not entirely inconsequential for each other, changes in techniques do not determine political forms or cultural norms and vice versa, as Bell himself has been at pains to point out. But neither do they determine or define all social and economic relationships.

As will be discussed below, the theory of post-industrial society as enunciated by Bell and taken up by others does not yield propositions

31. The British sociologist Anthony Giddens makes a useful distinction between what he calls "paratechnical relations" and such primarily social relations as class structure. See *The Class Structure of Advanced Industrial Societies* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975) P. 85 and *passim*.

about changes from industrial to post-industrial society which are empirically verifiable, even given its own intrinsically loose criteria. But, even more basically, it fails theoretically because it offers no way of defining industrial society per se, substituting instead an almost completely implicit and unexamined congeries of technological or other physical characteristics. A potentially useful definition of industrial society does exist, of course, in the work of Marx and one need not even be a quasi-Marxist such as Bell to recognize its utility.

Marx (not without justification given the historical context) equated modern capitalist and industrial society. He argued that the central characteristic of this society was the rationalization of all of the means of production and the domination of the worker by the system to such an extent that labor replaced life—and labor had become a commodity.³² Labor in industrial society was a commodity, uniquely so as compared to traditional, slave or peasant societies. It was not the machines it used to do work but its status as a commodity which defined labor's place in the new industrial society. Labor is still a commodity in so-called post-industrial societies, whether capitalist or socialist, which is why there is so little difference between them." The rationalization Marx speaks of now extends from the economic market place into all aspects of life, though its victory is far from complete, thanks in part to the irrationalism Bell and like-minded theorists rail against.

Does Post-Industrial Society Exist?

Theorists of post-industrial society fail at the outset, we have seen, to provide a useful definition of the concept per se. But they in essence allege that some new whole must be coming into existence because there are all these parts around which must somehow add up to something. In fact, do these phenomena really exist, are they related, and do they mean anything in terms of change from one form of society to another?

The first problem encountered in looking for post-industrial society lies in knowing where to look. Most—indeed virtually all—of Bell's evidence for the coming of post-industrial society is drawn from the

32. Karl Marx, *Wage Labor and Capital* (1847) and *Capital* Vol. I (1848).

33. Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital. The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974) P. 12 discusses how Lenin's fascination with Taylorism set in motion a process which has made the situation of Soviet and Western workers akin.

United States." Whether this fact has any deeper roots or significance than inclination, time, or the availability of data is difficult to judge. Bell makes no case for American exceptionalism in this context and, indeed, is forced to implicitly renounce such a position in order to defend himself against critics, especially Europeans, who hold that much of what evidence he adduces for the importance of science and technology in the American economy is a reflection of military spending, based on American mobilization for global war." Yet at the same time Bell—at the very least paradoxically—denies that what is happening in the United States will necessarily happen elsewhere, thus explicitly rejecting Marx's method of discussing British capitalism and telling other nations they could see their future history written in it." (He also concurrently avoids Marx's blunder of basing his economic analysis of capitalism on Britain and looking to France—a radically different country economically—for illustration of the working-out of class conflict in politics, sowing confusion for generations of followers.) For good or ill, however, Bell's analysis of post-industrial economics, politics, and even culture" is essentially American in provenance.

But Bell does talk, as we have seen, about the possibility of both capitalist and socialist post-industrial societies coming into existence, and the general tenor of his writings seems to imply that, as economic growth continues in various countries, they too will become post-industrial. Herman Kahn in equating post-industrial status with economic development and affluence explicitly universalizes this concept, and Bell has apparently never seriously objected to this interpretation publicly." Other commentators using the concept have ex-

34. This point has often been made by Bell's critics. See Marvin E. Olson in "Review Symposium: The Coming of Post-Industrial Society," *American Journal of Sociology* 80 (1974) P. 238 and Tilton in Tilton and Bell, *op. cit.*, P. 730.

35. Thus the French scholar Jean Floud holds "Post-industrial society turns out to be another name for the American Wehrwirtschaft." Bell, Floud, *et. al.*, *Technocracy and Politics*," *Survey* 17 (1971) 35.

36. Bell and Tilton, *op. cit.* P. 748.

37. In *Coming*, P. 13, Bell writes of a projected volume to deal with culture in post-industrial society. *The Cultural Contradictions* is apparently designed to fulfill that function as well as fleshing out the discussion of the political realm which the *Coming* downplays, and its discussion centers more exclusively on American than even the *Coming* does.

38. On pages 460-461 of *Coming*, Bell reproduces without cavil certain listings from the work of Kahn as part of a larger discussion which draws heavily on Kahn. In this context, it is anticipated that the year 2000 the United States, Japan, Canada, Scandinavia, Switzerland, France, West Germany and the Benelux countries will be "visably post-industrial" and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Italy, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Israel, and Australia, and New Zealand will be "early post-industrial."

tended it to western Europe and especially to Sweden" and, as noted, the Japanese are particularly eager to embrace the idea of post-industrial status.⁴⁰

Let us focus on a few of the postulated characteristics of post-industrial society which are empirically observable in order to determine whether any such societies do in fact exist. Perhaps the most important characteristic of post-industrial society is the postulated growth of the service industries. Post-industrial theory insists that service industries are growing at the expense of the blue-collar industries and that this change correlates with a rise in skill levels of workers and an expansion of the role of theoretical knowledge in society. The literature on the subject is vast and murky, flawed at the outset by its own problems of definition.⁴¹ Both corporation lawyers and Dallas

39. See, as examples, Hancock, *Sweden, op. cit.*, and "The United States, Europe..." *op. cit.* and his "Elite Images and System Change in Sweden," in Leon N. Lindberg, *Politics and the Future of Industrial Society* (New York: David McKay, 1976) Pp. 167-190. See also in the Lindberg volume Robert Inglehart, "The Nature of Value Change in Post-Industrial Societies," Pp. 57-99. Inglehart, however, uses the terms "post-industrial" and "advanced industrial" synonymously in an earlier article, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational. Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review* 65 (1971): Pp. 991-1017, and abandons the use of the term post-industrial in one published slightly later "Political Dissatisfaction and Mass Support for Social Change in Advanced Industrial Society," *Comparative Political Studies* 10 (1977): Pp. 455-472. Whether this represents on his part a theoretical conversion, shift with prevailing fashions, or sheer whim is impossible to guess. Usages such as post-industrial or even "advanced industrial" when applied to European politics are almost always those of American observers rather than of Europeans themselves. For an attempt to speculate on the relevance of the new ideas about the impact of technology on politics (including those of Bell (in Britain see Robert Williams "The Technological Society and British Politics," *Government and Opposition*, 7 (1972): Pp. 56-84.

40. See, for example, Taketsugu Tsuratani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society," in Lindberg, *op. cit.*, Pp. 100-125.

41. A preview of the post-industrial theorists' argument about the importances of services is provided by Victor Fuchs, "The First Service Economy," *The Public Interest* No. 2 (Winter 1966): Pp. 7-17. Bell has frequently been attacked (*cf.* Tilton in Tilton and Bell, *op. cit.*, 731) for his use of "services" as, in his own words, a "research, education, and government." *Coming, op. cit.*, P. 15. His position is directly attacked in Gershuny, *op. cit.*, Pp. 56-69 and Richard B. Halley and Harold G. Vatler, "Technology and the Future as History: A Critical Review of Futurism," *Technology and Culture* 19 (1978): Pp. 70-78. Gary Geppert, "Post-Affluence: The Turbulent Transition to a Post-Industrial Society," *The Futurist*, VIII (1974): Pp. 212-215 accepts the notion of a coming service economy but in a context of scarcity. See also Victor Ferkiss, *Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality* (New York: Braziller, 1969) Pp. 109-110, and Kumar, *op. cit.*, Pp. 200-205, 258. For background see Joachim Singlemann, "The Sectoral Transformation of the Labor Force in Seven Industrialized Countries 1920-1970," *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (1978): Pp. 1224-1234. Giddens, commenting on the effort of Ralf Dahrendorf and others to claim that the "service class" provides "a bridge between rulers and ruled" argued cogently for the importance of distinguishing adequately "between class and the division of labor," *op. cit.*, P. 187, pointing up the fact that much of Bell's argument would be irrelevant even if it were true.

Cowgirls are in service industries. What useful light can any calculation of how many "workers" may be placed in such a loose category shed on social structure? Nor are the categories of classification inherently stable. A semi-literate youth packing coke bottles in a Coca-Cola plant is a production worker, but a week later the same youth refilling a coke machine in an office will probably be classified as a service worker. What does his movement from one such job to another tell us about the nature of society?

Several facts seem to be clearly established. More workers can be classified as being in the service industries than ever before, probably a majority in the United States are so classifiable. Most of them are in jobs which require low skill levels, probably becoming lower." Because of lower productivity in the service industries, however, their contribution to the Gross National Product and the share of the consumer dollar they receive does not match their numbers. Virtually all of the expansion of the service industries has been at the expense—in a statistical rather than a historical sense—of agriculture; there are virtually as many "industrial" workers as ever in such representative modern nations as Britain, France, Japan and the United States." In a political context, it can be argued that we are not becoming a white-collar nation, much less one dominated demographically by a technically expert middle class, but still have a "working class" majority." The issue is complicated by the fact that there exists in America (and probably to a lesser extent elsewhere) a growing "pink collar" proletariat of underpaid female workers, largely but by no means exclusively in the "service" industries."

Is booming education a harbinger of rising skill levels and the increasing importance of theoretical knowledge?" College enrollments

42. This is the whole thrust of Braverman, *op. cit.*, *passim*, who holds, following a position first staked out by Charles Babbage, inventor of the principle of the computer, that this is necessarily so. Garshuny argues that skill levels may be decreasing, but not as a matter of necessity, *op. cit.*, Pp. 114-136. Kumar, *op. cit.*, tends to agree with Braverman, see especially Pp. 205-219.

43. Robert Heilbroner makes this point in *Business Civilization in Decline* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976) P. 66. See also his "Economic Problems of a 'Post-Industrial Society,'" *Dissent* XX (1973) P. 164.

44. See Andrew Levinson, *The Working-Class Majority* (New York: Penguin Books, 1974).

45. Louise K. Howe, *The Pink Collar Worker* (New York: Putnam, 1977).

46. Heilbroner argues that while specialized knowledge may be increasing, individuals as such may be less and less knowledgeable about the world in general. *Business*

are leveling off, subject to sharp marginal fluctuations, and among white males probably decreasing. The universities—indeed, schools generally—exist as much to keep young people out of the job market as to prepare them for it.¹ Unemployment and underemployment of college graduates and professionals are increasing problems in the United States and in many other industrial and even underdeveloped nations.

Is the importance of theoretical knowledge increasing in society? This is almost impossible to measure, but some suggestive indicators exist. If this were the case it would be hard to account for increasing worries voiced by American leaders about the inability of the United States to compete with other nations technologically or in terms of productivity.² Alarm over the low level of government and industry support for basic science and R and D is constantly heard, and even if one discounts for the self-serving nature of many of these complaints, they would seem to indicate the existence of a real problem. If we are becoming a post-industrial society we may also be becoming the first stagnant one.

What is true of the United States seems to be true of other candidates for post-industrial status as well. The phenomenon of the apparent growth of the service industries is virtually universal, but so is the possibility of objecting to giving these statistics the meaning attached to them in terms of their alleged social and political implications. A careful study of the British economy shows that while a growing number of workers are employed in providing services the share of the consumer dollar going to products rather than services has increased in the past ten years.³ While some nations are growing in technological and scientific strength, problems of employment for highly skilled graduates appear to be almost universal. In all nations

Civilization in Decline, *op. cit.*, P. 70. Also "Economic Problems of a Post-Industrial Society," in Morley, *op. cit.*, P. 27. See also Burke D. Grandjean, "The Division of Labor, Technology, and Education: Cross-National Evidence," *Social Science Quarterly* 55 (1975): Pp. 297-309, which argues that advanced education bears little relationship to either technology or the division of labor in society. See also Kumar, *op. cit.*, Pp. 219-230.

47. Kumar, *op. cit.*, Pp. 255-257.

48. On the American position in the world see Basiuk, *op. cit.*, Pp. 41-59 and Victor Ferkiss, "The Future of American Technology," in William B. Pickett, (ed.) *Technology at the Turning Point* (San Francisco: San Francisco Press, 1977) Pp. 63-75.

49. Gershuny, *op. cit.*, *passim*, also Gershuny, "Post-Industrial Society: The Myth of the Service Economy," *Futures* 9 (1977): Pp. 103-144 and "The Self-Service Economy," *New Universities Quarterly* 32 (1977-78): Pp. 50-66.

the situation is one of gradually lowering skill level for most workers (along, of course, with increased economic opportunities for a few specialists) and continued absorption into a system in which skill as well as labor is a commodity, perceived status uncertain, and alienation widespread.

The most charitable verdict that can be passed on the claim that services, and therefore skill and knowledge, are becoming more important is the Scottish "Not Proven," even leaving aside the question, "So what?"

There is a further theoretical objection that could be made even if the evidence for post-industrialism adduced by its theorists were much stronger than it in fact is which requires mention. We have argued (some might say quibbled) over the words "post" and "industrial." But what about "society"? Discussions of a post-industrial society almost universally focus on the nation state as the social unit. This may be valid in terms of political power or even social status for the most part. But it confuses the issue with reference to technological and economic factors. Is the United States a post-industrial "society" in these terms? Perhaps. It can certainly be held that parts of the United States are post-industrial as defined by Bell, just as other regions are industrial or even pre-industrial." Most Americans are aware of places such as Los Alamos, Route 128 around Boston, or "silicone valley" south of San Francisco. But their existence does not make the United States *as a whole* a post-industrial society.

50. Brzezinski speaks of three coexisting Americas, concentrated in different cities and regions, "industrial America," "pre-industrial America," and the "emerging new America—Technetronic America..." *Between Two Ages, op. cit.*, P. 200.

51. Ira Sharkansky says that it is "more accurate to speak of pockets of post-industrial society within the United States than about a post-industrial United States..." *The United States: A Study of A Developing Country* (New York: David McKay, 1975), P. 27, and holds "Daniel Bell's image of the post-industrial society is no more suitable for the United States of the 1970's than was his earlier vision of an 'end of ideology....' Only limited sectors of the United States are post-industrial, most typically those university towns where post-industrial writers dwell." P. 164.

Another commentator notes that while it is "tempting" to describe California as a post-industrial society following Bell's usage, this "can lead to misinterpretations," as "there is no evidence that California's economy has changed so much that industrialism has become peripheral rather than central, the way agriculture became peripheral after the industrial revolution." Many of the increased number of workers in the service industries provide "support services.... for the modern industrial system." Furthermore, knowledge is not central, "the major thrust of knowledge development in California seems to be to devise new ways for the industrial system to advance." Ted K. Bradshaw, "New Issues for California, the World's Most Advanced Industrial Society," *Public Affairs Report* (Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley) 17 No. 4 (August 1979) P. 1.

But neither would their economic predominance if that were to become the case. Nations are not closed systems economically as much as they may be politically or socially. Much—perhaps—most of the dirty work of American society has not been conjured out of existence by advanced technology, it has simply been exported. Stoop agricultural labor is increasingly performed in Mexico and the tomatoes and strawberries imported. The drudge work of electronics assembly is done in South Korea or Taiwan. Even such high technology primary industry products as steel are imported to the discomfiture of American industrialists and labor unions alike. To the extent that post-industrial society exists in the United States, it exists because large parts of industrial society have in essence been exported. The same thing is true—mutatus mutandis—of Sweden, Japan and other technologically evolved nations. Would one say that a village which had grown rich due to the discovery of a communal oil well had evolved a new post-labor society because it consisted of all retired owners and no more active workers or farmers? Hardly. Similar cautions must be kept in mind when speaking of the United States, where an island—however large it may be estimated to be—of post-industrial society exists in an artificial context within the present international economic order. Actually the continued existence of post-industrial society in the United States may well be dependent upon an international economic domination-subordination relationship, the stability of which is not written in the stars."

The Politics of Post-Industrial Society

If post-industrial society is not really coming into existence in the sphere of economics and society, what of its political aspects? Even if the service industries are not dominant and theoretical knowledge not that important, perhaps at least post-industrial politics is emerging mysteriously even without its postulated preconditions. Bell is extremely hard to pin down on what his theory postulates will happen in

52. The relationship between "post-industrial society" and America's economic position in the world is hinted at but not developed in Harry T. Targ, "Global Dominance and Dependence, Post-Industrialism, and International Relations Theory," *International Studies Quarterly*, 26 (1976): Pp. 461-482. Bell is aware of what is happening, though his theory fails to take it into account, for he speaks of "the emerging new international division of labor" and says "the traditional and routinized manufacturing activities which were the basis of the old Western industrial societies will be pulled out of the West by market and political forces...." *DuPont Context*, No. 3 (1978), P. 8.

53. Thus early on, waxing theoretical, Bell says "in sum, the emergence of a new kind of society brings into question the distributions of wealth, power, and status that

the political realm of post-industrial society. He simultaneously tells us knowledge not property is the basis of power yet denies he is predicting the coming of technocracy." However, most commentators, whether supporters or opponents of his ideas in general, have reached the conclusion that if he is saying anything at all—or at least anything new—it is that an era of industrial capitalism, in which men of property dominated political life, has been succeeded by a post-industrial era, in which men of knowledge will "dominate" politics."

are central to any society," though he goes on to say that these are "not dimensions of class, but values sought or gained by classes." *Coming, op. cit.*, P. 43. But later, in explicitly discussing "politics," he says that "If the dominant figures of the past hundred years have been the entrepreneur, the businessman, and the industrial executive, the 'new men' are the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists, and the engineers of the new intellectual technology," *Coming, op. cit.*, P. 344. The simple-minded can perhaps be forgiven if they conclude that when he says dominant he means not simply dominant in a general cultural sense but in terms of setting social policy, since certainly the dominant figures of the past with whom he contrasts his "new man" were largely so dominant. Elsewhere he tells us that there will be "emphasis on education as the mode of access to skill and power...." *Cultural Contradictions, op. cit.*, p. 199. What kind of power if not political? Earlier he has said that "the leadership of the newsociety will rest, not with businessmen or corporations as we know them...but with the research corporation...and the universities." "Notes on Post-Industrial Society," *op. cit.*, 27. In this formulation he defines the "domination" of institutions as consisting in providing challenges and enlisting the richest talents (*ibid.*), but this definition of dominance is lost in later explications. Yet while implying technocracy is coming, he explicitly denies it. Thus, "the crucial turning points in a society are political events. It is not the technocrat who ultimately holds power, but the politician." "Notes....," *op. cit.*, 34. Elsewhere he devotes a whole section of *Coming* to this problem (Pp. 341-367) concluding politics will remain dominant, having already told us that "it is more likely, however, that the post-industrial society will involve more politics than ever before...." *Coming, op. cit.*, P. 263 and again in *Cultural Contradictions*, he tells us that in the new society while "administrative aspects of the polity may be technocratic...political decisions are made by bargaining or by law, not by technocratic rationality." (P. 12) How the implied separation between administration and politics is to be maintained is not explained, however.

54. Thus a sympathetic expositor, futurist Edward Cornish, easily makes the jump from "dominance" to "power," writing "the post-industrial society is dominated by scientists and researchers. In the move from an industrial to a post-industrial society, the locus of power shifts from the business firm to the university and research institutes." *The Study of the Future* (Washington: World Future Society, 1977) P. 163. (Non-political power?) Gershuny writes of Bell that "He sees the post-industrial state as increasingly technocratic, with skills and education replacing birth, property and position as the basis of political power." *After Industrial Society, op. cit.*, P. 26. In his discussion of "post-industrial" society the Israeli sociologist I. Robert Sinai treats Bell's position as essentially technocratic, if "less lurid" than that of Brzezinski, and therefore false. *The Decadence of the Modern World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenckman, 1978)Pp. 152-167. Robert Putnam assimilates the ideas of Bell to those expressed in Jean Meynaud's *Technocracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1969) as a point for depar-

There is, of course, an alternative to both the domination of politics by property owners and the domination of politics by a knowledge elite, i.e., there is such a thing as political power per se and a political order that is a completely—or at least primarily—-independent realm controlled by force, guile, charisma, organizational ability, or whatever. Bell comes close to saying this at times, but he never presents us with a clear-cut statement about the nature of political power or the provenance of its welders, and he uses the word "power" so loosely we can only conclude that what he is trying to say is that a political order resting on the propertied classes is being succeeded by one based on a knowledge elite. Such at least is the lowest common denominator of the political theory of post-industrial society as it has grown up in the wake of Bell's theorizing.

The evidence drawn from both history and contemporary data would seem to indicate that such a conclusion is false. Technical knowledge of various kinds has been important to the establishment and maintenance of political power throughout human history." Just as no human society has ever existed without some kind of technology, none has ever existed without a knowledge elite. Ancient

ture for an empirical study of the evidence for and against the existence of technocracy. "Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Assessment of the Theory of Technocracy," *Comparative Political Studies* 10 (1977): Pp. 388-412. Bell himself invites such confusion—if confusion it really is—by statements such as the following: "it is clear that in the society of the future, however one defines it, he scientist, the professional, the *technicien*, and the technocrat will play a predominant role in the political life of the society." "The Post-Industrial Society: The Evolution of an Idea," *op. cit.*, P. 128. The problem of understanding what Bell is explicitly trying to say is accentuated by the fact that he never explicitly repudiates the general Marxist contention that in bourgeois society the men of wealth and property were the ultimate political ruling class. Thus, when he says that their "dominant" social role is being taken over by a knowledge elite it is only logical to assume that their political role is as well. No wonder one reviewer, Morris Janowitz, after concluding that Bell seems to be explicitly projecting a change in the elite structure as a result of technology goes on to characterize his idea of politics as confusing: "At each point in the argument the reader is confronted with questions not only of logical clarity but of empirical support...." "Review Symposium: The Coming of Post-Industrial Society," *American Journal of Sociology* 80 (1974) P. 233. On technocracy in modern society generally, see Margali Sarfath Larson, "Notes on Technocracy," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* XVLL (1972-73): P. 1-34, and Carlos Estavem Martins, "Technocratic Rule or Technocratic Counsel," *Ibid.*, P. 35-58.

55. This is the burden of Meynaud, *op. cit.*. Unfortunately his central term "technocracy" is defined so all inclusively, much in the manner of the use of "technique" by his fellow Frenchman Jacques Ellul (*The Technological Society*: New York: Knopf, 1964), that it becomes ubiquitous and hence of little explanatory value.

Rome had its military and fiscal "experts" as much as any contemporary nation does. But while members of such elites have been rewarded with varying degrees of economic wealth and social status and have often, as individuals or as groups, been members of the ruling political elites of society, they have never, as a distinctive group, been the wielders of ultimate decision-making power. The experts have always been kept on tap rather than being allowed to get on top by kings and parliaments. Ancient history provides the most striking example: in the case of the Roman Empire, where the "knowledge elite" consisted largely of Greeks, who were not only not rulers but were actually slaves." Throughout medieval and early modern history there have been inventors such as Da Vinci, financial wizards such as Condorcet, military/technological geniuses such as Vauban, but, however they may have been rewarded or honored, it was the kings and princes who ruled. In the nineteenth century the rise of liberalism and capitalism meant the gradual transfer of the locus of ruling power from landed wealth and hereditary social status to financial and industrial wealth. The James Wattses and the Edisons and the Siemens and the Whitneys have changed history, but they did so in accordance with the options permitted by the general logic of capitalist development and national aspirations. Scientific work was supported and exploited, technologies were introduced and developed in accordance with the needs of the business civilization. St. Simon may have dreamed otherwise for the future but it was only a dream and still is in its echoes in the theory of post-industrial society."

There is absolutely no reason to believe that either new and glamorous technologies or scientific-technological options such as atomic power, the computer, or the new biology has changed this situation. New scientific and technological development takes place in accordance with the needs of a society based on the (hopefully profitable) exchange of commodities. We still live in what Andrew

56. The relevance of this to contemporary theories of technocracy is discussed in S.M. Miller, "Notes on Neo-Capitalism," *Theory and Society* 2 (1975): P. 1-35.

57. The centrality of St. Simon as the originator of the concept of post-industrial society is discussed in Kumar, *op. cit.*, especially Pp. 27-44. As critics have noted (*cf.* Giddens, *op. cit.*, P. 255) Bell is aware of this and references to St. Simon are frequent, especially in *Coming*, but Bell fails to draw the obvious conclusion that a theory explaining an historical phenomenon prior to its alleged observance suggests that the theory is based primarily on aspiration rather than observation.

Hacker has called "a country called corporate America." It is true that non-profit enterprises have been playing a growing economic role in American society, but this is somewhat misleading, most of these are involved in military research or are "stalking horses" for profit making firms." Medicine is big business and so is higher education in

58. "A Country Called Corporate America," *New York Times Magazine* July 3, 1966, P. 8-9. The literature on the extent of the domination of the politics of the United States and other Western industrial nations by large economic interests is of course overwhelming in volume, though Bell tends to deprecate it, on one occasion referring to a critic citing such evidence as follows: "Mr. Peretz has discovered something called economic power like a political virgin who has seen the primal scene for the first time...." Francois Duchesne (ed.), *The Endless Crisis. America in the Seventies* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970) Pp. 133-134. Representative discussions of class structure and political power in modern industrial society include T.H. Bottomore, *Classes in Modern Society* (New York: Pantheon, 1966), and *Elites in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), *The Higher Circles* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971) and *The Powers That Be* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969), C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), Anthony Sampson, *The Anatomy of Europe* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), M. Scotsford-Archer and S. Giner (eds.), *Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971), J. Westergard and H. Resler, *Class in a Capitalist Society: A Study of Contemporary Britain* (London: Heinemann, 1965), and Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy* (New York: The Free Press, 1977). See also Peter Hall, (ed.), *Europe 2000* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) Pp. 205-225 and Andrew Hacker, "Who Rules America?" *New York Review of Books*, May 1, 1975. The validity of the argument that post-industrial society has changed the bourgeois structure of class domination is explicitly challenged in Ferkiss, *op. cit.*, Pp. 121-124, Sinai, *op. cit.*, Norman Birnbaum, *The Crisis of Industrial Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) Pp. 82-83, Bottomore, *Elites in Modern Society*, *op. cit.*, P. 89, Giddens, *op. cit.*, *passim*, Kleinberg, *op. cit.*, *passim*, Kenneth Dolbear, *Political Change in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974) Pp. 22-35 and Janowitz, *op. cit.*, P. 235. Heilbroner insists that post-industrial society to whatever extent it may exist is still capitalist in its structures of economic control. *Business Civilization*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 63-78. Christopher Lasch argues that "The post-industrial order, far from transcending the contradictions inherent in capitalism, embodies them in an acute form." "Toward a Theory of Post-Industrial Society," *op. cit.*, P. 47. Daniel Greenberg notes "scientists, rather than being the new men of power in American politics, comprise a very much misunderstood and politically fragile group whose proximity to power is easily confused with the real stuff of power." "The Myth of the Scientific Elite," *The Public Interest*, No. 1 (Fall 1965) 53. See also Victor Ferkiss, "The Spectre of the Scientific Elite," in Daniel McCracken *et. al.*, *Public Policy and the Expert* (New York: Council on Religion in International Affairs, 1971) Pp. 99-113, On technocracy generally see also Putnam, *op. cit.*

59. Kleinberg, *op. cit.*, P. 356.

its ethos and methods, even if virtually all universities and most hospitals are technically non-profit enterprises and small operators still abound. The only significant exception is found in the many new "think-tanks" related to national defense, so that the relationship between private profit and the provision of an alleged abstract social good has been muddied in the evolution of "Pentagon capitalism."⁶⁰ It is hard to think of the leaders of the military-industrial complex as the exemplars of a new knowledge elite, regardless of their technical qualifications. Bell, however, leans heavily on the importance of military considerations in leading to post-industrial society⁶¹ although he refuses to accept the validity of non-American criticism that it is the importance of the military sector that makes the United States a special case. But this is perhaps less of a difference than either Bell or his critics seem to realize since defense, politics, and capitalism are so closely intermeshed.

Thus, while it is true that the power of the business class in politics is diluted, as it always has been, by the desire and ability of political technicians and adventurers to acquire and wield formal decision-making power, it is absurd to suggest that scientific and technical knowledge per se are the forces behind decisions and that their possessors constitute a new class of ruler. Knowledge is used—and its possessors as well—when it can bring profit or power. Defense contracts have an economic rationale of their own beyond the rationality of purely or perhaps even primarily strategic considerations. The new biological technologies are pushed by the drug manufacturers and their medical partners.

Such technological marvels as communications satellites and nuclear power are part of the empire of corporate America rather than being the nucleus of any new republic of the intellect. The corporations are anxious to extend their domains to the depths of the high seas and the far reaches of outer space as technology permits and profit ordains.⁶²

In sum, then, Bell's position on political power has two facets.

60. See Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970) and *The Permanent War Economy* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1974).

61. "In one sense, as Herman Kahn has pointed out, military technology has supplanted the 'mode of production' in Marx's use of the term, as a major determinant of social structure." *Coming, op. cit.*, P. 356.

62. See Adam Hochschild, "Shuttling Manhattans to the Sky," *Mother Jones* III (May 1978): Pp. 37-51, and David Weir, "Waste Deep in the BIG Muddy," *ibid.*

Despite all his talk of the dominance of science and technology, Bell does allow for the autonomy of political institutions; thus his position cannot be refuted by evidence that the new men of power he touts do not in fact have the final say in decision making. The more overtly technocratic position of prophets such as Brzezinski is more directly undermined by such data. On the other hand, Bell seems to be saying that the old property-derived basis of political "clout" has been replaced by influence over the political process based on theoretical knowledge, and here he is clearly in error."

Post-Industrial Society and the Planned Society

But belief in the appearance of a new post-industrial politics does not rest simply on the vague idea that somehow, for the first time in human history, knowledge will replace property and wealth as the basis of power. It has other components as well. For Bell one aspect is the belief—indeed hope—in the coming into existence of a rationalized, planned society run by technicians, a society in which ideology will come to an end and be replaced by the solution of technical problems, one in which systems analysis will essentially replace politics.

The elitist connotations of this idea are so obvious as hardly to require explication." In any event, such a society does not appear to be on the horizon, for good or ill. PPBS has been pretty well discredited even among its proponents. The current American political scene presents a picture not of technical experts presenting rational alternatives among which potential leaders choose with perhaps some kibitzing from special interest groups but one of a confused nation struggling with a mixture of unemployment and inflation before which conventional economic science seems powerless. It is a politics marked by a myriad of interest groups battling bitterly over "energy policy," tax and fiscal questions, and environment and productivity

63. For example, "Under pressure from Southern politicians and rejecting warnings by its staff scientists, the Environmental Protection Agency has reapproved the 'emergency' use of a potent new pesticide against fire ants in Mississippi." Ward Sinclair, *Washington Post*, February 15, 1979.

64. Bell notes that "in the post-industrial society, ways of easing the strain between the technocrats and ordinary persons will be an important element in the cultural structure of each nation," and "Even in America, this type of reaction can be seen in the problems of the universities. While the universities are coming closer and closer to a technocratic attitude, social science students tend to reject this more and more. From now on, how to cancel out this reaction will be a major issue among the problems of education." In Duchene, *op. cit.*, P. 50. On technocracy and elitism see Kleinberg, *op. cit.*, Pp. 215-220.

issues in a political system with a divided bureaucracy, a virtually unmanageable Congress, and a weak chief executive. Experts abound, but coordination of policy is a chimera.

Other western democracies present hardly more inspiring pictures, with leading statesmen making pessimistic pronouncements about the future of democracy," while other analysts question whether the historic social democratic compromise between productivity and equality of distribution will continue to be viable or whether its breakdown will lead to the breakdown of capitalist democracy entirely."

More and more political issues have technical aspects—or at least such aspects are perceived more than in the past—and expert opinions fill the air, but the opinions conflict and the decision-making process seems not much less incremental and irrational than ever. Indeed Bell himself seems to voice a pessimism verging on despair regarding the ability of our society to make the kind of rational decisions his theory predicts as he perceives a rising tide of irrationalism in the larger culture of capitalist society.⁶⁷ The coming of post-industrial society

65. The report of a study group of the influential Trilateral Commission quotes former German chancellor Willy Brandt as saying Western Europe has "only 20 or 30 more years of democracy left in it." C.L. Sulzberger, "Danger for Democracies," *Washington Star* June 13, 1975.

66. Alan Wolfe, "Has Social Democracy a Future?" *Comparative Politics* 11 (1978) Pp. 100-125.

67. "In both doctrine and life-style, the anti-bourgeois won out. This triumph meant that in the culture antinomianism and anti-institutionalism ruled"....and the traditional bourgeois organization of life—its rationalism and sobriety—now has few defenders in the culture.... To assume, as some social critics do, that the technocratic mentality dominates the cultural order is to fly in the face of every bit of evidence at hand." *Cultural Contradictions, op. cit.*, P. 53. The relation of this theme to that of the *Coming* is not apparent at first, though Bell is clear in stating that he believes the social and cultural order can operate according to different norms and that indeed the clash he postulates between them may be the basis for revolutionary potential. Whether his discussion of culture is adequate or not theoretically is not at issue here, though see Roger D. Abrahams, "Contradicting Bell" in Review Symposium: The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (1977): Pp. 463-369. But from an historical point of view it can be argued that Bell oversimplifies in identifying capitalism with the Puritan ethic as he does in the section "From the Protestant Ethic to the Psychedelic Bazaar" in *Cultural Contradictions, op. cit.*, Pp. 54-80 since capitalism originated in luxury if not indeed in vice. See Werner Sombart, *Luxury and Capitalism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967). In any event, as a self-styled "friend" notes, Bell may be mistaken about the present state of American culture as the result of living in a highly unrepresentative milieu. See Andrew Greeley, *No Bigger Than Necessary* (New York: New American Library) Pp. 153-163.

was supposed to mean the end of ideological bedevilment but, the house having been swept clean, seven and more new devils of ideology seem to have entered in.

Some writers on the politics of post-industrial society, indeed, actually embrace the concept of what might be called neo-ideologization. Following Bell's premise—extrapolated by Kahn—that post-industrial society is one in which the old problems of economic scarcity have been put behind us, and therefore, implicitly the problem of traditional economic class conflict and ideologies based on such conflict, they postulate that post-industrial society will see the rise of new conflicts which will be more difficult to resolve since they will stem from questions of taste and values." Illustrations are not far to seek. Striking workers can agree with employers over wage demands and even questions about the incidence of taxation can be compromised in principle. But what kind of viable compromise can be created between proponents of abortion and "right-to-life" enthusiasts, or between supporters and opponents of "gay rights." If post-industrial society is by definition post-scarcity and post-economic society, its politics will be a politics of "life style" issues inherently less amenable to rationalization than older political issues. Many of those who speak of post-industrial society therefore predict an increasingly conflict-ridden and politically unmanageable society as these new issues come to dominate politics." Above all, there will be struggles between the new technocratic elites and the increasingly frustrated masses." Even Bell himself sometimes seems to lean in this

68. Inglehardt, *op. cit.*, Tsurani, *op. cit.*

69. Bell's colleague Huntington, after noting that "To a considerable degree, the post-industrial society is not at all political..." goes on to argue that it will be highly conflict ridden and "could be extraordinarily difficult to govern." "Post-industrial Politics: How Benign..." *op. cit.*, Pp. 164, 177, and suggests elsewhere that "it would be argued that political parties are the political form peculiarly suited to the needs of industrial society and that the movement of the United States into a 'post-industrial' phase means the end of the party system as we have known it." "The Democratic Distemper," *The Public Interest* No. 41 (Fall, 1975) P. 23. Todd La Porte and C.J. Abrams suggest that a major cause of the instability in post-industrial society will be a perceived discrepancy between the supposed ability of society to solve its problems through technocratic means and its actual ability to do so. "Alternative Patterns of Post-Industry: The California Experience," in Lindberg, *op. cit.*, Pp. 19-56.

70. See, for example, Duchene, *op. cit.*, P. 24 who writes that "Early industrialism produced anarchism and fascism.... The post-industrial society might have to accept them as endemic, and face recurrent outbreaks, much as traditional society suffered the plague." Bell himself sees conflicts of and within the meritocracy, *ibid.*, Pp. 129-130, including "a conflict between elites and masses who want their own form of

direction in his recognition that the technologically based, economically rationalized society he foresees has within it new potentialities for alienation." Where he differs from other commentators is in deploring tendencies which many others welcome.

Perhaps the most extreme, or at least the most clear-cut, exposition of the idea that post-industrial society will bring a new revolutionary politics of alienation comes from some "New Left" theorists, of whom French sociologist Alain Touraine may be taken as an example." There is a new class emerging as a result of technological and economic change, Touraine agrees with Bell, but while it is necessary to society and wields much power on a low-level, day-to-day basis it is necessarily alienated by being reduced in status and freedom by the mechanisms of capitalist industrialism. This "new working class" of technicians and intellectuals is undergoing the same process of status degradation that skilled workers experienced in Marx's time, and it is reacting in the same way by turning to revolutionary politics, as illustrated by the actions of (some) university students in France, the United States and elsewhere in the 1960s. Post-industrial society will eventuate in a final revolution against capitalism by this new class and the final conquest of freedom.

To what extent do these speculations adequately describe contemporary reality? This question can only be answered in a provisional manner. Obviously "life style" issues have been coming to the fore as

participation..." Jeffrey A. Ross sees the possibility of, if not revolution, rebellion against the technostructure on the part of those excluded from decision-making. "Entropy and Violence: An Analysis of the Prospects for Revolution in Post-Industrial Society," *American Behavioral Scientist* 20 (1977): Pp. 457-471. After asserting that Bell, "gives little attention to the role of political institutions and processes," Timothy Hennessey and B. Guy Peters come to essentially the same conclusions. "Political Paradoxes in Post-Industrialism: A Political Economy Perspective," *Policy Studies Journal* 3 (1975) P. 233.

71. Especially of youth. *Cultural Contradictions*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 189-191. Hancock finds a high degree of alienation in post-industrial Sweden, but is not clear on the extent to which it is a function of post-industrialism or arises from other sources in Swedish literature and philosophy where it is especially notable. *Sweden*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 73-74. Kahn and Weiner expect alienation but only in part, and believe that despite it post-industrial society can be highly stable. *The Year 2000*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 199-200, 212, 217.

72. *The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow's Social History: Classes, Conflicts, and Cultures in the Programmed Society* (New York: Random House, 1971). This is essentially the position taken by Lasch, who argues that "the post-industrial order is an inherently unstable form of society. There are good reasons to think that it may not even survive the twentieth century." *op. cit.*, P. 48. On the "New Working Class," in J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach (eds.), *Radical Sociology* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), Pp. 341-352.

manner. Obviously "life style" issues have been coming to the fore as affluence has increased. But old issues have not disappeared for two reasons. One is that affluence is not as widespread as postulated by post-industrial theorists. The second is that ability to attain desired life styles and possession of economic power are not wholly unrelated. Those political factions in the United States, often but not always Republican, which hoped to gain power by reaching masses who were "conservative" on "social" (life style) issues even if they tended toward "liberalism" on economic issues have been largely disappointed. Also, despite concern about environmental issues and the "quality of life" generally and such matters as crime and sexual morality both here and in other Western capitalist democracies (including, of course, Japan, at least insofar as the former issues are concerned), economic conflict remains a staple of politics, more so than even in an era of perceived energy shortages and exhortations to "austerity." The reason is simple: post-industrialism is not completely a myth, but whatever elements of it do exist have simply been added to (or grafted onto) industrialism rather than having superceded it, just as industrialism has not completely eliminated agrarian life and its problems.⁷³ Insofar as there are any differences between post-industrial society and industrial society (and, as we have argued, the differences are marginal and illusive rather than basic and real, post-industrial society being simply a more developed stage of industrial society), any changes in political issues and forces to which these differences give rise will not eliminate the basic issues and forces of the politics of industrial society but will only add to their complexity.

73. Bell in a footnote in *Cultural Contradictions* says "I should emphasize the fact that a post-industrial society does not 'displace' an industrial society, or even an agrarian society.... A post-industrial society adds a new dimension, particularly in the management of data and information in a complex society...." P. 198. "Well grubbed, old Mole!" But what does this casual admission leave of the whole grandiose theory of post-industrial society, indeed of the concept of society itself as Bell seems to be using it?

Post-Industrialism As An Ideology

If the "theory" of post-industrial society has so little to recommend it logically or empirically, why is it so popular? The answer is obvious. It functions—or has functioned—as a useful ideology for certain social forces and interests. It is an ideology in that it supports and justifies a certain way of looking at what is happening or what it is hoped will happen, a way of looking at social change congenial to persons and groups with particular interests and predilections." This is not to say that it is exceptional, as social theories go, in this respect. Nor, it should be stressed, is this to say that Bell and his followers are necessarily consciously seeking to mask reality for sinister purposes. But neither persons nor groups can totally abstract themselves from their backgrounds, interests, and life experiences, direct or vicarious.

What functions does the post-industrial ideology serve in contemporary intellectual politics? It is first and above all an attempt to refute classical Marxism, not by denying its validity but by going beyond it. Neither Bell nor most other post-industrial proponents would consider themselves conservatives or "right-wingers," nor would they and their ideas probably be welcome in traditional conservative circles. Not for them Burke or De Maistre or Calhoun, Goldwater or Charles Maurras or Russell Kirk. They are "liberals" and/or, to varying degrees, "social democrats." Yet they accept the existing Western capitalist order—especially as they see it evolving—as both desirable and inevitable. The early stages of industrialism may have led to oppression and misery, making class con-

74. On Bell as an establishment ideologist see Kleinberg, *op. cit.*, esp. Pp. 22-23 and Michael Marien, "Daniel Bell and the End of Normal Science," *The Futurist* VII (1973): Pp. 262-268. Marien elsewhere speaks of *Coming* as "a venture in welfare-state ideology." "The Two Varieties of Post-Industrial Society," *Futures* 9 (1977) P. 426. Touraine also sees Bell as "an ideologist," or, as he is personally independent, 'a doctrinaire'." "Review Symposium: The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," *op. cit.*, P. 470. Giddens describes Bell as "advanced capitalism's most successful advertising man," *op. cit.*, P. 21, while Michael Miles argues "Official liberals have ready in the vision of a post-industrial society a theory of social and economic change by which they can dismiss in advance any opposition to the corporate state." *The Radical Probe: The Logic of Student Rebellion* (New York: Atheneum, 1971) P. 80. Even a sympathetic critic holds that "Although Bell seeks to provide an objective analysis, his approach is somewhat distorted by certain• implicit normative biases of an Establishment intellectual." Jones, *op. cit.*, P. 20.

flict a moral and' political option. But capitalism by unleashing the powers of science and technology has, through economic growth, made possible enough prosperity and through the rise of the (carefully managed) social welfare state enough equality (of opportunity—the only legitimate aspiration, as Bell especially insists)" to satisfy any legitimate aspirations of the common man. Whether or not this economic utopia has in fact been achieved in the United States or in any of the other industrial democracies is beside the point; it is obvious why those who are well-off in these societies would like to believe that it has been and that industrialism *along with its discontents* has been superseded by history. Post-industrial ideology triumphs over Marxist ideology by rendering it simply *vieux jeu*.

The second ideological function of the ideology of post-industrialism is the defense of the "new class" in American society and its current status and aspirations.⁷⁶ Deep down inside virtually

75. See "Coda," to the *Coming*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 408-451

76. There is much confusion on this issue among post-industrial theorists because of the fact that the "new class" is divided—to vastly oversimplify—between technocrats and what are often styled "literary intellectuals," the latter group being allegedly largely adherents of an "adversary culture" hostile to many elements of technocracy. As Jones states, *op. cit.*, "Bell presupposes that his projected meritocratic elite is likely to succeed in its use of intellectual technology to cope with societal problems. With some qualification, he glorifies the knowledge elite and manifests belief in the efficacy of established institutions." Yet *Cultural Contradictions* is largely devoted to the theme that the intelligentsia is a menace to the society Bell envisages, leading to a disjunction between the cultural and societal realms. Bell's friend Kahn devotes much energy and fervor to discussing the dangers posed by important elements of the new knowledge elite, *Things to Come*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 88-113. Similarly, S.M. Lipset writes "...Daniel Bell...and others have identified the intensified strength of this leftward tendency, as a reflection of structural changes in advanced or 'post-industrial' society, which have created a massive intelligentsia, a highly educated oppositionist class." "The Paradox of American Politics," *The Public Interest* No. 41 (Fall, 1975) 172. Apparently post-industrialism, like capitalism, creates its own gravediggers. Arch-conservative political theorist and tactician Kevin Philips accepts the concept of post-industrial society and uses it to explain how post-industrialism has led to the domination of politics by a knowledge elite hostile to traditional American values, one which must be politically combatted. "The Post-Industrial Revolution has created a new knowledge elite heavily liberal in politics." *Mediocracy. American Parties and Politics in the Communications Age* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975) P. 31. Philips virtually identifies the post-industrial society with the "Communications" revolution. *Ibid.*, P. v as of course Bell himself does at times. *Coming*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 214, 479. One observer sees resentment against liberal post-industrial elites leading to fascism. Dale Vree, "A Fascism in Our Future?" *Worldview* 20 (November 1977): Pp. 14-23. For a balanced view of the "new class" see James T. Barry, "Welcome to the New Class," *Commonweal* CVI (1979): Pp. 73-77. See also B. Bruce-Briggs, (ed.), *A New Class?* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).

every American intellectual (especially every American social scientist) believes he or she could run the country better than his/her brother-in-law who sells securities or automobiles (Harvard types are alleged to believe their relative superiority is especially marked)." The new class of scientists and managers which proliferates in American universities and the civil service and the "technostructure" of the large corporations (more bureaucratic than entrepreneurial as is often pointed out) obviously finds congenial a theory which heralds, predicts, and justifies (for does not historical inevitability make right, as Hegel and Marx teach and their pupils never forget) the rise to power of the person of specialized, certified, knowledge as opposed to the businessman, politician, or labor leader. (So, of course, do their counterparts in "underdeveloped" nations which have not taken the concept of post-industrial society to heart, but in most of these the superiority of the bureaucrat is so well established as hardly to require all this ideological underpinning.)

The ideology of post-industrial society in some respects is simply another manifestation of the ideology of American managerialism which surfaced during the Progressive era. The turn of the century American sociologist Lester F. Ward (himself a civil servant) would find little new in this aspect of the theory of post-industrial society and perhaps be jealous that his concept of "sociocracy" had not merited at least the recognition by denunciation accorded Burnham's "managerial revolution."⁷⁷ Insofar as the ideology of post-industrial society is, despite Bell's disclaimers, an ideology of technocracy the reason for its popularity should be obvious. So too is the unanswered question, "*Quis custodet custodes?*"

Finally the ideology of post-industrial society serves the function of providing an apologia for rationalism. Not only does it tell us we can forget about class war since all problems are problems of managing relative prosperity. Not only does it predict the coming to "power" of a new knowledge elite, centered in the universities. It also tells us that there are rational answers to our problems and a rational standard by

77. See John LeBoutillier, *Harvard Hates America* (South Bend: Gateway Editions, 1978).

78. See John K. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967) esp. Pp. 86-97.

79. On Ward see S. Chugerman, *Lester F. Ward: The American Aristotle* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1939) and Paul F. Boller, Jr., *American Thought in Transition: The Impact of Evolutionary Naturalism 1865-1900* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971) Pp. 64-69.

means of which our new rulers may rule us. But, if there are rational answers, there must be data and for there to be data it must be in the last analysis objectifiable and quantifiable. Thus the importance given by Bell and his epigoni to systems analysis, "social indicators," and similar devices for rationalizing the discussion of social issues. Here we see the deepest extent to which post-industrial society is at one with (indeed, simply an extension of) industrial society.

A rationalized management of social life extends the impulse of capitalist industrialism, noted by critics as ideologically disparate as Marx and Weber, not simply at the epistemological level but also by implication, and ultimately through social causation, at the ontological level. The quality of life, as well as its economics, must be quantified so that decisions can be based on a computer printout. Life in this city, this crime, this act of love must all have their objective ratings or else the aspiration toward rationalization remains unfulfilled. (How many hours, dear Professor, did you spend last month "counseling students" as opposed to "doing research," the dean's questionnaire asks.) Here again, as in the coming of the knowledge elite, post-industrial society is an ideology of aspiration ("Come Holy Non-spirit"). For the claims to power of the technicians and the efficacy and ubiquity of technique are inseparable. Here also, is the fear that reason, or at least the "single vision" which Blake deplored, will not triumph in the face of the retrogressive forces of irrationality. The passages in Bell's *Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* deploring the danger that rising unreason will negate the coming of post-industrial society are a cry of anguish which match in force of affect if not felicity of style those with which, from an almost diametrically opposed point of view, Max Weber somberly greeted the impending triumph of bureaucratic rationalization of life.

At the last, it should be noted, Bell seems to lose his nerve about the benefits of a technocratic rationalized post-industrial society when in the *Cultural Contradictions* he argues that, for society to survive, religion is necessary (for all or just the masses?). One can only speculate about what kind of religion would find post-industrial rationalization congenial and at what level of analysis of human life. Similarly, one can only speculate as to how, in post-industrial society Bell's hoped for religious revival would begin. Shall "*Pro Christo et Ecclesia*" be restored to the Harvard seal?"

80. Bell's position on religion is found in *Cultural Contradictions, op. cit.*, Pp. 146-171. For a less pessimistic view of the current state of American religion see Greeley, *op. cit.*

Post-Industrial Ideology in the Soviet Bloc

We have concluded that post-industrial society is in fact an ideology which rejects Marxism in favor of a capitalist industrialism and predicts and justifies the coming to power of a knowledge elite ruling by rationalistic norms. Those who share these value positions and aspirations will therefore find the theory of post-industrial society congenial. But what of the "non-capitalist" world? What relevance, scientific or ideological, does the theory as explicated by Bell and others have for this large segment of human society?

As noted, Bell and other post-industrial theorists generally confine their attempts to describe post-industrial society to the United States and other Western capitalist democracies. There is some material on the Soviet Union in the *Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, but virtually all of it is polemical in nature. Yet the clear position of Bell and the explicit statement of Kahn are that the Soviet Union and the other "socialist" countries are becoming or may become post-industrial societies.

Considerations of space and the difficulty of obtaining comparable data do not permit a close analysis of the empirical aspects of this phenomenon. But, generally speaking, it would appear that developments similar to those which post-industrial theorists allege provide the basis of their arguments seem to be taking place in the socialist world.

There is a growth in the service industries and the technical middle class, though there seems to be some tendency for skilled workers to retain higher social and especially economic status vis a vis lower-level white-collar workers than may be the case in capitalist countries." One can also speculate that a swollen government bureaucracy takes the place in their evolving economies which in capitalist nations is filled by both private and public workers in the "service" sector. Use of the computer is growing apace. Increasingly, scientists and technicians are emerging as important elements in society.

But, by the same token, it is quite clear that the same objections can be made to the assumptions about the upgrading of the skill levels of

81. On class structure in the Soviet Union and other socialist states, see Birnbaum, *op. cit.*, Pp. 99-105; Bottomore, *Classes in Modern Society*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 56-75; Giddens, *op. cit.*, Pp. 223-237; Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order: Social Stratification in Capitalist and Communist Societies* (New York: MacGibbon and Kee, 1971); and Murray Yanowitch and Wesley A. Fisher, *Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR* (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975).

the work force in the socialist countries as in the West." Also, whatever may be the case of relative shifts of power from property to knowledge in the West, the party in socialist states still keeps its technical intelligentsia in a highly subordinate position." That some alienation seems to result parallels western data. Lack of open legitimate political conflict and particular cultural differences diminish the evidence available of the emergence of "post-industrial politics" in such nations, but the environment has caused some elite concern in the Soviet Union and, ironically, rapidly industrializing Poland is in the throes of a bitter "life style" conflict, but over church and state. In sum, what can be said is that, if the theory of post-industrial society had not arisen in the United States and France, it would probably never have been invented to describe developments in the Soviet bloc.

Soviet ideologists—which is, of course, to say all members of the Soviet social science establishment—explicitly and violently reject Bell's concept of post-industrial society, clearly recognizing its purpose and function as constituting a post-Marxian theory of social change. Indeed, they have for some time regarded all "futurology" as "bourgeois," exemplifying an attempt on the part of capitalist intellectuals to deny the validity of "scientific socialism" and to substitute technological innovations for the class struggle as the basis of social change. In recent years, however, their attitude has mellowed and a school of what might be called "socialist futurology" has arisen." Many Soviet thinkers have become as bemused by spec-

82. Braverman, *op. cit.*, P. 12.

83. On relations between party and intelligentsia in the Soviet bloc, see Alfred Parry, *The New Class Divided* (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Mario Hirsztowitz, "Intelligentsia vs. Bureaucracy? The Revival of a Myth in Poland," *Soviet Studies*, XXX (1978): Pp. 336-361; and David Jora³sky, "Political Authorities in the Soviet State," *Survey* 23 (1977-1978): Pp. 36-41. Also relevant is Vernon L. Aspaturian, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex: Does it Exist?" *Journal of International Affairs* (London) 25 (1972): P. 1-28.

84. However, Eric P. Hoffmann argues for the existence of significantly open internal discussion on the problems of the Scientific-Technological Revolution within Soviet intellectual circles. "Soviet Views of 'The Scientific-Technological Revolution'," *World Politics* XXX (1978): Pp. 615-644.

85. For attacks on Bell's concept see E. Arab-Ogly, *In the Forecasters' Maze* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) Pp. 67-84, 229-231; V. Kosolapov, *Mankind and the Year 2000* (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976) Pp. 71-77. See also V. Mikheyev, "The 'Managerial Revolution' Myth," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 9 (September 1972): Pp. 58-61.

For general attacks on "bourgeois futurology" see Arab-Ogly, *passim*, esp. Pp. 7-102; Kosolapov, *op. cit.*, Pp. 6-192. See also Ralph Hamil, "A Russian Looks at Western

tacular advances in technology as have their Western counterparts and have concluded that, where there is the smoke of new technology, there must be the fire of revolutionary social change. It is, of course, difficult to sustain this position within the framework of traditional Marxist ideology and, as a result, they have developed a theory which is even more vague and difficult to deal with than the capitalist version of post-industrial society which they reject.

In current Soviet discussions the place of the concept of post-industrial society is taken by something called the Scientific-Technological Revolution, a concept which enjoys patronage at the highest political levels." Its characteristics have been described in the following terms:

Basically, the scientific and technological revolution is a sweeping qualitative transformation of productive forces as a result of science being made the principle factor in the development of social production."

The immediate consequence will be the "supplanting" of "man's direct participation in production by the operation of applied knowledge...radically changing the whole structure and composition of productive forces.... ' "

This is "above all a socio-economic phenomenon," creating a "new material and technical base for the next social and economic system...." 89

How, if at all, does this Scientific-Technological Revolution (STR, or VTR in Russian) differ from post-industrialism? Not really in any basic respect. There is, ironically, considerable convergence between the two theories or ideologies. In both theories science and technology will increasingly provide the basis for political choice and ultimately for political power. What Soviet theorists have cleverly done is finesse the most objectionable (to Marxist eyes) aspect of post-industrial

Futurism," *The Futurist* IV (1970) 216 and Igo V. Bestuzhev-Lada, "Utopias of Bourgeois Futurology," *ibid.*, Pp. 216-217. On Soviet futurology see P. Apostol, "Marxism and the Structure of the Future," *Futures* 4 (1972): Pp. 201-210 and Murad Saifulin (ed.), *The Future of Mankind* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973).

86. Thus at the 1971 party Congress Prime Minister Brezhnev spoke of the need "organically to fuse the achievements of the Scientific and Technological Revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system," Quoted in Arab-Ogly, *op. cit.*, P. 231.

87. P.N. Fedoseev, "The social significance of the scientific and technological revolution," *International Social Science Journal*, XXVII (1975) P. 152.

88. *Ibid.*

89. Kosolapov, *op. cit.*, Pp. 21, 13.

theory, the assumption that the class war has been superceded by a new system of social power based on knowledge rather than property. For, after all, the Soviet Union is already a socialist state in which, given the abolition of private property, the class system has come to an end. Therefore the benefits of the STR are now available to all in a society in which knowledge will determine social goals and mankind will be freed of all the unpleasant aspects of industrial society. Where Bell and post-industrial theorists are wrong, STR theory asserts by implication, is in claiming that the post-industrial society can really come into existence under capitalism. Only under socialism can the new wonders which the STR makes possible come to pass."

Thus while rejecting—or transcending—the aspect of the theory of post-industrialism which is anti-Marxist, the theorists of the STR are able to whole-heartedly embrace its fundamental premise: economic growth through technology leading to a society run by possessors of knowledge acting according to purely rational norms (within the overall context of Marxist ideology, of course). Whereas theorists of post-industrialism refuse to consider that, if the essence of industrial society is making labor a commodity (and eventually making all of life a process of the exchange of commodities), post-industrial society does not differ essentially from industrial society but is merely an extrapolation of it, Soviet theorists of the STR assume by definition that under socialism labor is already no longer a commodity and industrial society has already entered a new phase. In so assuming—contrary to the facts of economic and social life in socialist societies—they parallel

90. The concept of the scientific and technological revolution essentially stems from work first done in Czechoslovakia. See Radovan Richta *et. al.*, *Civilization at the Crossroads. Social and Human Implications of the Scientific and Technological Revolution* (White Plains, N.Y.: International arts and Humanities Press, 1969). On the concept of the STR see Arab-Ogly, *op. cit.*, Pp. 225-231; Kosolapov, *op. cit.*, Pp. 10-44; Fedoseev, *op. cit.*, and *passim*; Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Cocks, *Political Development in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1977) Pp. 54-62; Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, and "The Scientific Management of Society," *Problems of Communism* XXVI (May-June 1977): Pp. 59-67; Julian M. Cooper, "The Scientific and Technological Revolution in Soviet Theory," in Frederick L. Fleron, Jr. (ed.), *Technology and Communist Culture. The Socio-Cultural Impact of Technology Under Socialism* (New York: Praeger, 1977) Pp. 146-179; Robin Laud, "Post-Industrial Society: East and West," *Survey* 21 (1975): P. 1-17; and Kerstin Nystrom, "Soviet Sociology and The Scientific-Technological Revolution," *Acta Sociologia* 17 (1974): Pp. 55-77. See also Gernot Bohme, "Models for the Development of Science," in Spiegel-Rosing and Price, *op. cit.*, Pp. 338-342. Bell discusses the concept in its early stages of development in *Coming*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 105-112 and "The Post-Industrial Society: The Evolution of a Concept," *op. cit.*, Pp. 152-158.

the errors of western post-industrial theorists in overstating the extent to which recent technological and social changes have altered the fundamental nature of industrial society. Soviet theorists go even further, however. They speculate or assert that the new technologies of the STR will finally make possible the transition from socialism to true communism, a long-awaited event which has tended to recede into the future throughout Soviet history. Thus the purported benefits of the STR serve the ideological function of giving hope that the new day may yet be at hand and, thanks to the STR, the socialist segment of mankind at least can finally enter into the realm of freedom."

Thus the theory of the STR has the same basic ideological function in socialist societies as the theory of post-industrial society has in capitalist societies—defense of the increasingly technocratic, rationalistic social order and culture created by the industrial revolution. Both are ideologies which mask and uphold the triumphant evolution of industrial society into its fuller maturity as "super-industrial" society, to borrow Alvin Toffler's phrase.⁹¹ Both describe as a basic transformation what is in reality an extrapolation and consolidation and in so doing they rationalize the increased power of the economic and political elites on both sides of the largely meaningless ideological struggle between socialist and capitalist society.

Both the theory of post-industrialism and that of the STR are defenses of bureaucratic technocracy, and both have the same enemies (though, ironically, Soviet theorists seem more concerned with problems of bureaucratization and other undesirable side effects of new technological systems than Bell and others in the "liberal" Western camp are, at least on paper).⁹² Branded as irrational are any upsurges of intellectual or popular resistance to the total rationalization and quantification of social life and culture. What is antinomianism for Bell, represented above all by the horrors of the "counter culture" becomes superstition and reaction for socialist leaders, and is

91. Thus, according to one writer, the STR will mean the end of "commodity production." Kosolapov, *op. cit.*, P. 33. One the realm of freedom in Marx see *Capital*, Vol. III.

92. *Future Shock*, (New York: Bantam Books, 1971) P. 491.

93. On Soviet fears of technocracy and bureaucratization see Hoffmann, "Soviet Views," *op. cit.*, P. 626 and Fedoseev, *op. cit.*, see Cooper, *op. cit.*, P. 194, Kosolapov, *op. cit.*, P. 167. Elsewhere Hoffmann argues that the information revolution of which STR theorists make so much (see Kosolapov, *op. cit.*, Pp. 196-202) will not have any important effects on the political system. "Technology, Values, and Political Power in the Soviet Union: Do Computers Really Matter?" in Fleron, *op. cit.*, Pp. 471-485.

represented by religion, nationalism, and simple aspirations for individual freedom.

What Would a Post-Industrial Society Really Be Like?

But to say that post-industrialism and the **STR** are essentially convergent ideologies implies that the real function of post-industrial theorizing cannot be primarily, or at least exclusively, the defense of mature capitalist industrialism against Marxist ideology, as some of Bell's Marxist critics have claimed. If there is in essence an ideology of post-industrial society which transcends quarrels between liberal capitalism and socialism, against what is it directed? The interests of what social forces are furthered by the belief that industrialism has been superseded by something new rather than simply being more powerful than ever? Obviously there can be only one answer to that question. The theory of post-industrial society is a defense of industrialism itself and of those bureaucratic, technocratic social elements which have increased their power as industrialism has entered its advanced stage. It is a defense not simply of a managerial elite based on property and wielding power accordingly, but of managerialism itself, whatever the particular basis of its access to political and social power at any given time and place. Post-industrial theory as enunciated by Bell, Kahn, and the **STR** theorists is a defense of industrial society against any attempt to supersede it. It is a defense, ironically, against any *real* post-industrialism.

A truly post-industrial society would be one in which the major characteristics of industrial society would be replaced by radically different characteristics. It would be one in which labor was no longer a commodity but an aspect of living. It would be a society in which property ownership was sufficiently widespread so that any power derived from it was similarly diffused, and one in which scientific and technical knowledge was sufficiently widespread so that any power derived from it was also diffused. A real post-industrial society would be a society which was decentralized rather than centralized, which was populist rather than elitist, and which recognized that reason and rationalism are not synonymous. It would be a society which was democratic rather than technocratic.

Various social theorists have postulated the desirability and possibility of such a society and a vast literature exists about what a

truly post-industrial society would be like." The theory of post-industrial society as enunciated by Bell and similar thinkers is a counter ideology which has the function of denying the possibility that such a real post-industrial society can exist. It does this in several ways: by postulating inevitable social changes in the same direction in which industrial society has hitherto evolved, by confusing the issue by claiming that industrial society has hitherto evolved, by confusing the issue by claiming that industrial society has essentially changed its nature, and even by appropriating the term post-industrial itself. For, ironically, Bell admits that the term is not his own invention but was first used by the English social theorist Arthur Penty in the early decades of the century." He implicitly recognizes but fails to stress that Penty was an opponent of industrialism, a Guild socialist influenced by William Cobbett and William Morris who would have rejected with horror the brave new world of technocratic planning envisioned by Bell and his followers.⁹⁶ Bell credits Penty with the term by referring to a book which Penty published in 1917.⁹⁷ But the term was first used slightly earlier, in the title of a book by Penty and art critic Ananda Coomaswamy, *Essays on Post-Industrialism*, which, though advertised, apparently was never published. The advertisement appeared as an endpaper in an early edition of one of the most prescient essays in social theory written in our century, *The Servile State* by British Distributist writer and litterateur Hilaire Belloc, which argued

94. On "alternative" post-industrial concepts of value see Victor Ferkiss, *The Future of Technological Society* (New York: George Braziller, 1974); Theodore Roszak, *Person-Planet. The Cultural Disintegration of Industrial Society* (New York: Doubleday, 1978) and *Where the Wasteland Ends. Politics and Transcendence in Post-Industrial Society* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972); E.F. Schumacher, *A Guide for the Perplexed* (New York; Harper and Row, 1977) Manfred Stanley, *The Technological Conscience* (New York: The Free Press, 1978) and William Erwin Thompson, *Evil and World Order* (New York: Harpers, 1976). See also Hall, *op. cit.*, Pp. 226-238. On economic and social aspects of "alternative" post-industrialism see Ferkiss, *The Future of Technological Civilization*, *op. cit.*; Greeley, *op. cit.*, *passim*, Leopold Kohr, *The Breakdown of Nations* (New York: Dutton, 1978); William Ophuls, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity* (San Francisco; W.H. Freeman, 1977); E.F. Schumacher, *Small Is Beautiful* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976) and E.V. Stavrianos, *The Promise of the Coming Dark Ages* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976).

95. *Coming*, *op. cit.*, P. 37.

96. See his *Post-Industrialism*. With a Preface by G.K. Chesterton. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1922).

97. *Old Worlds for New: A Study of the Post-Industrial State* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1917).

that the struggle between capitalism and socialism would not result in the triumph of the latter but simply the creation of a new society in which government dominated the individual in the name of never-to-be-accomplished social goals of equality and harmony, a new society which had no ideology and claimed no name.⁹⁸

Lenin is often loosely quoted as saying communism was socialism plus electricity.⁹⁹ Add recent technological advances to the system described by Belloc and you get the post-industrial society posited by Bell and STR theorists as well. The concept of post-industrial society is the ideology of the Servile State.

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98. Marien, "Two Varieties," *op. cit.*, P. 417. Belloc's book has been recently republished in the United States with an introduction by the distinguished neo-conservative sociologist Robert A. Nisbet. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1977).

99. What he actually said was that "Communism is Soviet Power plus the electrification of the whole country," Report of the Eighth Party Congress, 1920, excerpted in Robert C. Tucker (ed.) *The Lenin Reader* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), P. 494.